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Abstract
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) show that a simple homogeneous
market with exogenous matching has a continuum of (non-competitive)
perfect equilibria; however, the unique Markov perfect equilibrium
is competitive. By contrast, in the more general case of heteroge-
neous markets, we show there exists a continuum of (non-competitive)
Markov perfect equilibria. However, a refinement of the Markov prop-
erty, which we call monotonicity, does suﬃce to guarantee perfectly
competitive behavior: we show that a Markov perfect equilibrium is
competitive if and only if it is monotonic. The monotonicity property




The theory of competitive equilibrium provides an elegant and simple account
of how markets work. By contrast, the strategic analysis of markets tends
to be complex and intractable. Extensive-form market games have many
equilibria, in which a variety of diﬀerent kinds of behavior are sustained by
threats and counter-threats
In a seminal paper, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990), henceforth RW,
analyze a market for a single indivisible good. There is a finite number
of buyers and sellers who are matched in pairs and bargain over the terms
of trade. The trading process can be formalized as a simple, extensive-form
game. RW show that this dynamic matching and bargaining game1 possesses
a large set of perfect-equilibrium outcomes,2 a result reminiscent of the Folk
Theorem for repeated games.3 Most of these equilibria do not correspond to
the perfectly competitive outcome.
RW also consider conditions under which perfect-equilibrium outcomes
are competitive. For example, it is shown that any perfect equilibrium in
which equilibrium strategies are Markovian (anonymous) is competitive. In
a similar vein, Sabourian (2001), henceforth S, has investigated a refinement
based on lexicographic minimization of the complexity costs of implementing
strategies. In the context of RW’s model, he shows that perfect equilibria
satisfy this refinement only if they are competitive.
These results suggest that perfectly competitive behavior may obtain
where agents are required to use simple strategies. Unfortunately, both RW
and S restrict their attention to a very simple environment, a market for
a single indivisible good consisting of B identical buyers and S identical
1In the sequel, when we refer to market games, we have in mind games of this general
type.
2We use the term perfect equilibrium to embrace both subgame perfect equilibrium
and sequential or perfect Bayesian equilibrium, as appropriate. In markets where a single
pair of agents is matched at any time, it is suﬃcient to use the concept of subgame perfect
equilibrium. Sequential or perfect Bayesian equilibrium is needed when simultaneous
matching and bargaining are allowed. In the following discussion, where the technical
diﬀerences are not important, we use the term perfect equilibrium to cover both cases.
3An important feature of RW is that it analyzes a market with a finite number of agents.
The preceding literature (Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), Gale (1986a,b,c, 1987), Bin-
more and Herrera (1988a,b), McLennan and Sonnenschein (1991), Osborne and Rubinstein
(1990)) assumes a non-atomic continuum of agents, each of whom has a negligible eﬀect
on equilibrium.
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sellers, each of whom wants to trade at most one unit of the good. In a het-
erogenous market, where buyers (or sellers) have a range of valuations of the
good, things turn out to be more complicated. In particular, the refinements
proposed by RW are insuﬃcient to guarantee competitive behavior.
Gale and Sabourian (2002a,b), henceforth GS, extend the approach of S
to the case of a heterogeneous market. They show that in a heterogeneous
market with deterministic matching and bargaining, every perfect equilib-
rium with complexity costs (PEC) corresponds to a competitive outcome.
Although the general approach is similar to S, the analysis is more diﬃcult.
Further, as we shall see, it is necessary to impose substantive restrictions on
the matching process in order to guarantee competitive behavior.
In the present paper, we take the Markov property as our starting point.
Markov strategies play an important role in the analysis of dynamic games
because of their simplicity and recursive structure and because the Markov
property or some other stationarity assumption is often enough to reduce or
eliminate the indeterminacy of equilibrium. Here are some examples:
• In the theory of repeated games, the Folk Theorem guarantees the
existence of a large set of subgame pefect equilibria. However, the
subgame perfect equilibria in Markov strategies correspond precisely to
the Nash equilibria of the stage game (Masso and Rosenthal (1989)).
• In bargaining games under incomplete information, there are many
non-stationary equilibria (Ausubel and Deneckere (1989), Sobel) but
a unique Markov perfect equilibrium (Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson
(1986)).
• In bargaining games with more than two players and complete informa-
tion, there are many subgame perfect equilibria but the Markov perfect
equilibrium is unique (Shaked (1994), Herrero (1985)).
• And, as mentioned above, in a homogeneous market with exogenous
matching, RW show that a market game has a continuum of (non-
competitive) perfect equilibria, whereas the Markov perfect equilibrium
is unique and perfectly competitive.
The last result suggests that the Markov property might be suﬃcient for
perfect competition in the present context. In fact, unlike the homogeneous
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case, a heterogeneous market has a continuum of non-competitive Markov-
perfect equilibria. This surprising result raises the question of what is dif-
ferent about dynamic matching and bargaining models that makes station-
arity (the Markov property) such a weak refinement. One motivation for the
present study is to understand better the structure of games with random
matching and bargaining and why they produce pathological Markov equilib-
ria.4 Of course, there are other reasons why equilibria fail to be competitive
and we present examples of these in the sequel, but our main interest lies
with the Markov property and the extra assumptions that are needed to get
a determinate and competitive equilibrium.
Although it is not suﬃcient for perfect competition, the Markov prop-
erty does play a role in characterizing competitive behavior. Our second
result is to show that a simple strengthening of the Markov property, called
monotonicity, is suﬃcient for the competitive outcome. This property is in-
teresting in its own right and also helps us to see why diﬀerent matching
processes work in GS. In particular, if the matching process is deterministic,
any Markov equilibrium (suitably defined to take account of time varying
matches) automatically satisfies the monotonicity condition. Monotonicity
also turns out to have a close relationship to lexicographic minimization of
complexity costs.
The relationship between this paper and GS is somewhat complex. GS
focuses on deterministic matching models, where the matching process can
be exogenous or endogenous, and agents can be matched simultaneously or
sequentially. In this paper we study exogenous and random matching pro-
cesses, which for the most part are sequential, although in Section 7.2 we
briefly consider the implications of simultaneous matching, which turns out
to be problematic from the point of view of competitiveness and determi-
nateness.
Another way of looking at the relationship between the two papers is to
observe that GS analyzes cases in which the Markov equilibria are competi-
tive whereas the present paper analyzes cases in which Markov equilibria are
not necessarily competitive.
To sum up, the paper makes two main contributions. On the one hand,
we show that the Markov property is not suﬃcient to induce a competitive
outcome in markets with sequential, random matching or exogenous, simul-
4We also note that discounting does not help to reduce the non-competitiveness of
equilibria.
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taneous matching. On the other, we show that a simple strengthening of the
Markov property (that can in turn be justified by appealing to complexity)
is suﬃcient to induce a competitive outcome in markets with sequential ran-
dom matching. Clearly, the success of the program of using complexity costs
to select a competitive outcome depends on the matching and bargaining
model used and on the precise definition of complexity used.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explore the
diﬀerences between homogeneous and heterogeneous markets and explain
why the methods used in RW may not suﬃce to characterize competitive
behavior in the richer, heterogeneous environment. The game is defined
formally in Section 3. In Section 4, we present two examples that illustrate
the types of non-competitive equilibrium behavior that can easily arise in
heterogeneous markets.
In Section 5, we introduce the notion of monotonicity. In any Markov
equilibrium, payoﬀs are non-increasing over time. More precisely, an agent
will never trade if he expects a higher payoﬀ in the continuation game. How-
ever, it may be that the agent’s payoﬀ will be higher with positive probability
in some future subgame, as is the case in the examples of non-competitive
Markov equilibria in Section 4. We call an equilibrium monotonic if ev-
ery agent’s payoﬀ is non-increasing with probability one and not simply in
expectation. Here we show that monotonic, Markov equilibria with perfect
responses5 are precisely the competitive equilibria.
In Section 6, we investigate the connection between the concept of mono-
tonicity and a natural definition of complexity and show that lexicographic
minimization of complexity costs in equilibrium implies monotonicity and
hence competition.
Robustness and extensions are discussed in Section 7. We present an
example of non-existence of perfect equilibria with complexity costs and an
example of indeterminacy with simultaneous matching.
5Equilibrium with perfect responses is a mild refinement of Nash equilibrium: it requires
that, in every match that occurs along the equilibrium path, the equilibrium strategy
specifies an optimal response to every price oﬀer, not just the oﬀers that are made in
equilibrium. This is a much weaker refinement than perfect equilibrium, which requires
optimal responses in every subgame.
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2 Dynamic matching and bargaining games
2.1 Homogeneous markets
RW study the following market game. There are S sellers and B > S buyers.
Each seller has one unit of an indivisible good and each buyer wants to buy
at most one unit of the good. A seller’s valuation of the good is 0 and a
buyer’s valuation is 1. Time is divided into discrete periods or dates indexed
t = 1, 2, .... At each date, the agents are randomly matched in pairs consisting
of one seller and one buyer (each feasible configuration of pairwise matches
has equal probability). One member of the pair is randomly chosen to be the
proposer and the other is the responder. Each member has probability 1/2
of being chosen as proposer. The proposer oﬀers to trade at a price p ∈ [0, 1].
The responder accepts or rejects the oﬀer. Unmatched buyers are forced to
remain inactive throughout the period.
If agreement is reached, the two agents trade at the agreed price p and
leave the market. The buyer receives a payoﬀ 1− p and the seller receives a
payoﬀ p. There is no discounting.
Agents have complete information about the past play of the game, but
at the moment when they choose their actions they do not know the identity
of the other matches or the actions simultaneously chosen by other agents.
Simultaneous moves require the use of perfect Bayesian equilibrium as the
solution concept.
The central result obtained for this model in RW is the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For every price p∗ between 0 and 1 and for every one to one
function β from the set of sellers to the set of buyers there exists a perfect
equilibrium in which seller s sells his unit to buyer β(s) for a price of p∗.
In other words, there is a continuum of perfect equilibrium outcomes. Here
is the intuition behind the result for the case of a single seller (S = 1). One
buyer b∗ is identified as the intended recipient of the good at a price p∗. The
equilibrium strategies require the seller to oﬀer the good at a price of p = 1
whenever he is the proposer and is matched with a buyer b 6= b∗. Every buyer
b 6= b∗ rejects the oﬀer. Whenever buyer b 6= b∗ is the proposer he oﬀers to
buy the good at a price of p = 0 and the seller rejects. When the seller meets
buyer b∗, whichever is chosen as the proposer oﬀers a price p = p∗ and the
responder accepts. These strategies clearly produce the required outcome
and the payoﬀs of the seller and buyer b∗ are p∗ and 1− p∗, respectively.
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To prevent a deviation, RW make use of the following punishment strate-
gies. Suppose that the seller has deviated by proposing a price p 6= p∗. The
responder rejects this oﬀer and the game then moves into a subgame in which
the rejecting buyer b∗∗ becomes the intended recipient of the good and the
selling price becomes p∗∗ = 0. The strategies are the same as those given
earlier with the price p∗∗ in place of p∗ and buyer b∗∗ in place of buyer b∗.
Similarly, if one of the buyers deviates by oﬀering a price p 6= p∗ then the
seller rejects, another buyer b∗∗ 6= b∗ is chosen to be the intended recipient
and the price at which the unit is traded changes to p∗∗ = 1.
Deviations from these punishment strategies can be treated in an exactly
similar way.
These strategies are ultimately quite complicated, in the sense that there
is no limit to the number of potential deviations and each additional devia-
tion requires a tailor-made response that makes the play of the game more
complicated. As RW point out, one can think of this construction as requir-
ing a large amount of information for the players to execute the equilibrium
strategies. As an alternative they consider a model in which the amount of
information available to the agents is strictly limited. Specifically, the game
satisfies the following assumption:
(Anonymity) At the beginning of each date t, all that the buyers
and sellers know about the previous play of the game is the number
of buyers Bt and the number of sellers St remaining in the game.
Under this assumption, the proposer’s strategy is a function of the number
of buyers and sellers (Bt, St) and the date t. The responder’s strategy is a
function of the numbers of agents (Bt, St), the date t and the proposal p. RW
show that, under the anonymity assumption, the only equilibrium outcome
is the competitive one.
Theorem 2 If each player’s information consists only of Bt, St, and t, the
unique perfect equilibrium outcome is such that the good is sold for a price
p = 1.
Two points are worth noting. First, Anonymity is weaker than theMarkov as-
sumption. Markov strategies are functions of a minimal set of payoﬀ-relevant
variables at each date. They cannot be conditioned on variables that do not
directly aﬀect the future payoﬀs of the game. Anonymous strategies, by con-
trast, are allowed to depend on t. Secondly, the assumption of anonymity
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has the immediate eﬀect of preventing the agents from punishing a deviator,
because deviations are not remembered after they occur.
Two further variations of this basic model are considered in RW. One
is to introduce a common discount factor 0 < δ < 1 and study the perfect
equilibrium for the case of a single seller and B buyers. Let x(δ,B) and




1− x = δ(1− x+ 1− y)
2B
.
For fixed values of δ and B, 0 < x(δ,B) < y(δ,B) < 1; but x(δ, B) and
y(δ,B) converge to 1 as B →∞ or δ → 1.
Theorem 3 Suppose that S = 1 and that all agents discount the future using
the common factor 0 < δ < 1. Then there is a unique perfect equilibrium. In
this unique equilibrium trade takes place immediately and the price is x(δ,B)
or y(δ, B) depending on whether the buyer or seller was chosen to propose.
Theorem 3 can be interpreted as demonstrating that the multiple equi-
libria of Theorem 1 are not robust. However, RW show that the unique-
ness found in Theorem 3 depends on the assumption of exogenous matching.
They consider a further variant of the basic model in which a single seller can
choose, at the beginning of each period, which buyer he wants to bargain with
in that period. In the model with endogenous matching, the indeterminacy
of equilibrium returns in a strong form.
Theorem 4 If S = 1 and the seller can choose in each period the buyer
with whom he wishes to bargain, there is a continuum of perfect equilibrium
outcomes: for each buyer b and each price (2 − δ)/2 ≤ p ≤ 1, there is a
perfect equilibrium in which buyer b receives the good and the price is either
p or δp/(2− δ), according to whether the seller or buyer b is the proposer in
the first meeting between them.6
6Note that the degree of indeterminacy in Theorem 4 is independent of the number of
buyers B but depends on the discount factor δ. However, the interval of possible prices p
converges to [1/2, 1] as the discount factor δ approaches 1.
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The strong impression left by these results is that indeterminacy of equi-
librium is a robust feature of market games and, in particular, there is no
reason to expect the outcome to be perfectly competitive. However, as we
have seen, the strategies required to support the family of equilibria in these
models can be very complex. Indeed, RW suggest as much in the context of
their Theorem 2. Gale (2000) argues that bounded rationality, in the form of
a large but limited memory, also guarantees competitive behavior.
Following these suggestions, S undertakes a systematic analysis of the
role of complexity in sustaining a multiplicity of non-competitive equilibria.
More precisely, S introduces the notion of complexity costs into the market
game of RW. Relative complexity is measured by a partial ordering on the
agents’ strategies. Roughly speaking, a strategy f 0k is said to be more more
complex than a strategy fk if there exists a set of histories H such that fk
and f 0k are identical except on H, fk specifies the same action everywhere on
H and f 0k specifies more than one action on H. (This concept of complexity
costs was introduced in Chatterjee and Sabourian (2000)). More complex
strategies are assumed to be more costly to use, but the costs are small
relative to the payoﬀs. Therefore, an agent first maximizes his payoﬀ and
then minimizes the complexity cost. Formally, an agent lexicographically
minimizes complexity costs if he chooses a strategy that is a best response
and is no more complex than any other best response. A perfect equilibrium
with lexicographic complexity costs (PEC) is a perfect equilibrium in which
every agent lexicographically minimizes complexity costs.
Lexicographic minimization of complexity costs is quite eﬀective at elim-
inating equilibria in RW’s market game. In fact, S shows that there is a
unique PEC, with and without discounting, with exogenous and endogenous
matching, and with one or more sellers.7 Furthermore, the equilibrium out-
come selected is always competitive, in the sense that all trade occurs at the
competitive price p = 1. The intuition for S’s result in the case of a sin-
gle seller is the following. In any non-competitive PEC in which the seller
receives a payoﬀ of less than 1 there cannot be an agreement at a price
of 1 between a buyer and a seller after any history; otherwise some player
can economize on complexity. (For example, consider what happens if, after
some history, a buyer is oﬀered the price p = 1 and he accepts; then by a
complexity argument the buyer should accept p = 1 whenever it is oﬀered.
7Note that some of the results depend on the precise definition of complexity used in
S and on whether or not complexity costs are positive.
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Accepting p = 1 whenever it is oﬀered guarantees the seller an equilibrium
payoﬀ of one). This implies that for any non-competitive PEC all continu-
ation payoﬀs of all buyers are positive; but this cannot be so in any SPE in
which there are more buyers than sellers. (By competition, in any SPE with
B > S, there must be a buyer with a zero continuation payoﬀ after some
history). The result for S > 1 is established by induction.
The conclusion suggested by S is that complex strategies are required to
sustain a multiplicity of non-competitive outcomes and that a mild refinement
of equilibrium eliminates most of them. This provides a rationale for the
competitive equilibrium as the only sustainable outcome in a simple market
game.
2.2 Heterogeneous markets
These are important results, but unfortunately they only apply to the case of
a homogenous market consisting of B identical buyers and S identical sellers.
A market consisting of heterogeneous buyers and sellers is quite diﬀerent.
For the purposes of the present paper, we define a heterogeneous market as
follows. As in the homogeneous case, there is a single indivisible good that
is exchanged for money and each agent wants to trade at most one unit of
the good. Without loss of generality, we can assume that there are equal
numbers of buyers and sellers.8 Buyers are indexed by i = 1, ..., n and sellers
are indexed by j = 1, ..., n. Buyer i’s valuation of the good is denoted by
vi ≥ 0 and seller j’s valuation is denoted by wj ≥ 0. We assume that buyers
and sellers can be ordered so that
v1 > v2 > ... > vn
and
w1 < w2 < ... < wn.
These valuations define demand and supply curves that determine the com-
petitive, market-clearing price(s) in the usual way. The marginal traders
i = j = m are defined by the conditions
vm > wm
8Sellers with extremely high valuations and buyers with extremely low valuations can-
not trade in any case.
10
vm+1 < wm+1.
The interval of perfectly competitive prices for the market is
max {vm+1, wm} ≤ p ≤ min {vm, wm+1} .
Exchange between any two inframarginal traders i, j ≤ m is eﬃcient whereas
exchange between an inframarginal trader and an extramarginal trader is
ineﬃcient. Exchange between two extramarginal traders is not individually
rational.
Compared with the heterogeneous market, we can see that the homoge-
neous market is special in several respects.
• Eﬃcient trade: In a heterogeneous market, trade between an infra-
marginal seller j ≤ m and an extramarginal buyer i > m is always
ineﬃcient, but can be individually rational if vi > wj. Likewise, trade
between an inframarginal buyer i ≤ m and an extramarginal seller
j > m is always ineﬃcient, but can be individually rational if vi > wj.
In a homogeneous market, by contrast, each buyer’s valuation is greater
than each seller’s valuation, so trade is always eﬃcient by definition.
Ineﬃcient trade is a possible deviation from perfect competition in a
heterogeneous market that cannot occur in a homogeneous market.
• Division of surplus: In the homogeneous market, except for the special
case B = S, the competitive equilibrium price is either 0 or 1 and
all of the surplus goes to one side of the market. As was pointed out
above, the analysis in S depends crucially on the fact that one side of
the market receives a zero payoﬀ in a competitive equilibrium. In a
heterogeneous market, there will typically be agents receiving positive
payoﬀs on both sides of the market. The characterization of equilibrium
outcomes becomes much more complicated as a result.
• Invariance of the competitive prices: In the homogeneous market, the
set of competitive prices remains constant, independently of the set of
agents remaining in the market. For example, if B > S then no matter
how many pairs of agents have traded, the number of remaining buyers
is greater than the number of remaining sellers and the competitive
price remains equal to 1. In the heterogeneous market, this need not
be so. For example, if the competitive interval is [wm, vm] and the
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marginal buyer and seller trade first, the competitive interval becomes
[max {vm+1, wm−1} ,min {vm−1, wm+1}] ,
which is strictly larger given the assumption that vm−1 > vm > vm+1
and wm−1 < wm < wm+1. Similarly, if an inframarginal buyer i ≤ m
trades with an extramarginal seller j > m, or an extramarginal buyer
i > m trades with an inframarginal seller j ≤ m, then the competitive
interval changes. In some cases, the new competitive interval may not
even intersect the old one. This leads to problems with the characteri-
zation of equilibrium, as we shall see.
For all these reasons, and a number of others, the analysis of a heteroge-
neous market is more complicated, conceptually, analytically, and substan-
tively, than the analysis of a homogeneous market.
More important than the diﬃculty of analyzing a heterogeneous market
is the existence of new kinds of non-competitive equilibria, not encountered
in the homogeneous case, for example, equilibria in which trade is ineﬃcient.
Furthermore, the refinements proposed by RW cannot eliminate these non-
competitive equilibria. For example, as we explained before, anomymity (a
weak Markov property) is suﬃcient for perfect competition in a homogeneous
market with exogenous random matching. In a heterogeneous market, it
is easy to construct non-competitive Markov equilibria for a market with
sequential random matching. The following example is studied in detail in
Section 4.1.
There are two buyers and two sellers and all agents are infra-
marginal: w1 < w2 < v2 < v1. In this simple example, per-
fect competition requires all trade to occur at a uniform price
p ∈ [w2, v2]. We construct a continuum of Markov SPE in which
diﬀerent pairs of agents trade at diﬀerent prices in the sequential
random matching model. We can even choose these non-uniform
prices to lie outside the competitive interval [w2, v2].
Another refinement proposed by RW is the introduction of a small amount
of discounting. In Section 4.2, we take the example above and introduce
discounting.
There is a common discount factor 0 < δ < 1 and the valuations
are symmetric: w1 = 0, w2 = w, v2 = v, v1 = v + w. We
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characterize the unique symmetric Markov SPE and show that it
is not competitive: even in the limit as δ → 1, the equilibrium
prices at which trade occurs are non-uniform.
Thus, discounting may eliminate indeterminacy (we have not established
this) but it does not imply perfectly competitive behavior.
The Markov SPE of the examples in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 satisfy the con-
ditions of PEC, for certain definitions of complexity. Whether the refinement
proposed in S helps in selecting a competitive outcome in the heterogeneous
case depends both on the definition of complexity and the nature of the
matching process. In GS we use a natural extension of the definition of com-
plexity in S and show that such a refinement selects a competitive outcome
in deterministic models. This definition of complexity has a ‘local’ character
– it defines a partial order on the set of strategies with reference to a given
set of remaining agents. Thus, roughly speaking, in GS a strategy f 0k is said
to be more complex than a strategy fk if there exists a set of agents N such
that fk and f 0k are identical except on H(N), where H(N) is the set of histo-
ries such that N is the set of agents remaining in the market, fk specifies the
same action everywhere on H(N) and f 0k specifies more than one action on
H(N). This definition of complexity has the property that Markov strategies
are minimally complex. Since this implies that any Markov SPE is also a
PEC, it follows that the examples of Section 4 constitute counter-examples
to this refinement, given the definition of complexity used in GS. On the
other hand, in Section 6 we use a diﬀerent extension of the complexity con-
cept introduced by S. This definition of complexity has a ‘global’ character
and does not refer to the set of remaining agents. Roughly speaking, this
definition says that a strategy f 0k is more complex than a strategy fk if fk
and f 0k are identical everywhere except that, either as a proposer or as a
responder to some price oﬀer, fk specifies the same action everywhere on the
set of all histories H and f 0k specifies more than one action on H. Note that
the Markov strategies are not necessarily minimally complex according to
this definition of complexity. So the examples in Section 4 do not constitute
counter-examples to the refinement using this definition of complexity. In
fact, we show below that lexicographic complexity costs (according to this
definition and applied to Markov strategies) can provide a justification for
the competitive equilibrium.
These examples demonstrate that in order to characterize perfect compe-
tition in a heterogeneous market, stronger conditions will have to be placed
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on equilibrium strategies. In addition, substantial restrictions have to be
placed on the structure of the game. In particular, if exogenous, simultane-
ous matching is allowed then a new set of non-competitive Markov-perfect
equilibria can emerge. In Section 7.2 we consider an example of a hetero-
geneous market in which there are two buyers and two sellers but only one
buyer and one seller are inframarginal.
Suppose that w1 < v2 < w2 < v1. In a competitive equilibrium,
only w1 and v1 can trade. However, if exogenous, simultaneous
matching is allowed, it is easy to construct equilibria in which w1
trades with v2 and w2 trades with v1.
This will be true for any exogenous matching process, random or determin-
istic, in which, with positive probability, v1 is matched with w2 and v2 is
matched with w1 at the first round. The intuition is similar to the Diamond
corner (Diamond (1971)). If one pair of agents expects the other pair to
trade at the first round, they are eﬀectively in a two-person economy. The
existence of the other pair provides no competitive pressure. In order to en-
sure that competition does occur, we have to ensure that not all trade can
occur at once. We do that here by assuming that only one pair of agents is
matched at a time.
These examples show, first, that in the random matching model, the
Markov property is not suﬃcient for competition, secondly, that while dis-
counting ensures uniqueness, at least within the class of symmetric equilib-
ria, it does not deliver the competitive outcome as it did in the homogeneous
case, and, thirdly, that exogenous, simultaneous moves are inconsistent with
competition. Clearly, the heterogeneous case is quite diﬀerent from the ho-
mogeneous case.
3 The market game
A heterogeneous market is defined, as in Section 2, by the valuations v =
(v1, ..., vn) and w = (w1, ..., wn)). The trading game is defined by the follow-
ing rules:
• At each date, a pair of agents consisting of one buyer and one seller is
chosen at random from the agents remaining in the market. One mem-
ber of the pair is chosen at random to be the proposer; the remaining
agent becomes the responder.
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• The agent chosen to be proposer oﬀers a price p. The responder must
accept or reject this oﬀer. If the oﬀer is accepted, the good is traded
at the agreed price and both agents leave the market. If the proposal
is rejected, there is no trade and all agents begin the next period with
the same endowments.
An agent’s information at the beginning of date t consists of the matches,
proposals and responses observed in all previous periods. During the period,
all the agents observe the set of agents remaining in the market, the choice of
proposer and responder, the price oﬀered by the proposer, and the response.
An agent’s strategy maps all the available information into a choice of action
at each date.
Given the market parameters v = (v1, ..., vn) and w = (w1, ..., wn), the
game is defined as follows. Play occurs at a countable sequence of dates
t = 1, 2, .... At each date t, the set of players remaining in the game is
denoted by N . The set N is balanced, that is, it contains an equal number
of buyers and sellers. An ordered pair hk, ci is randomly selected from the
set N , where the first agent k is the proposer and the second agent c is the
responder. We assume that:
• The pair hk, ci consists of a buyer and a seller;
• Each remaining buyer has an equal probability of being chosen and
each remaining seller has an equal probability of being chosen;
• The buyer and seller chosen have equal probability of being chosen as
proposer and responder.
We adopt this particular matching rule for simplicity. As we mentioned
before, the matching probabilities are not important as long as each agent
remaining in the game has a positive probability of being chosen and the
matching probabilities are stationary, that is, they depend on the set of
agents remaining in the market, but not on the date. The assumption that
only one buyer and one seller are matched at each date is crucial, however,
as the example in Section 7.2 shows.
Because we will later use arguments based on the complexity of strategies,
we have to be somewhat pedantic about the description of the game. Let
I denote the set of buyers, J the set of sellers, and K = I ∪ J . At each
date t, the play of the game consists of the choice of a matched pair hk, ci,
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a proposal p ∈ R+, and a response r ∈ {accept, reject}. A finite history of
the game consists of a finite sequence
{(hk1, c1i, p1, r1), ..., (hkt−1, ct−1i, pt−1, rt−1), hkt, cti}.
Let Ht denote the set of finite histories at date t and H = ∪∞t=1Ht the set
of all finite histories. We use h to denote a generic finite history and also
the initial segment of a history. Thus, h0 = (h, hk, ci) ∈ Ht denotes a finite
history h0 ∈ Ht with initial segment
h = [(hk1, c1i, p1, r1), ..., (hkt−1, ct−1i, pt−1, rt−1)]
and a match hk, ci at the final date t.
For any finite history h, let N(h) denote the set of remaining agents. We
denote the set of histories after which agent k is the proposer by Hpk , where
H
p
k = {(h, hk, ci) ∈ H},
and the set of histories after which agent k is the responder by Hrk , where
Hrk = {(h, hc, ki) ∈ H}.
A strategy for agent k is a function fk defined on Hk = H
p
k ∪ (Hrk ×R+) such
that
fk(h) ∈ R+, ∀h ∈ Hpk
and
fk(h, p) ∈ {accept, reject}, ∀(h, p) ∈ Hrk ×R+.
Let Fk denote the set of strategies for agent k and let F = ×k∈KFk denote
the set of strategy profiles.
Given any strategy profile f , there is a unique (stochastic) outcome that
determines the payoﬀ Uk(f) of each agent k. The market game Γ = (K,F,U)
is defined by the set of agents K, the set of strategy profiles F and the payoﬀ
function U = ×k∈KUk. A Nash equilibrium of Γ is a strategy profile f∗ such
that, for each k,
Uk(f
∗) ≥ Uk(f∗−k, fk),∀fk ∈ Fk..
The game described is a game of perfect information (and chance moves)
so the appropriate equilibrium concept is usually perfect equilibrium. We
will later introduce a weaker notion of equilibrium (to deal with some ex-
istence issues) but for the examples in the next section perfect equilibrium
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will do just fine. Informally, we define a subgame perfect equilibrium to be a
strategy profile f∗ such that for every subgame (h, hk, ci) or (h, hk, ci, p) the
continuation strategies f∗|(h,hk,ci) or f∗|(h,hk,ci,p) form a Nash equilibrium for
the subgames Γ|(h,hk,ci) and Γ|(h,hk,ci,p), respectively.
Here we are interested in Markov Nash equilibria, in which the equi-
librium strategies have the Markov property, that is, for any finite histo-
ries (h, hk, ci) and (h0, hk, ci) in Hpk such that the set of remaining agents is
N = N(h) = N(h0),
f∗k (h, hk, ci) = f∗k (h0, hk, ci),
and for any finite histories (h, hc, ki) and (h0, hc, ki)in Hrk and any price oﬀer
p ∈ R+,
f∗k (h, hc, ki, p) = f∗k (h0, hc, ki, p).
For such an equilibrium, strategies can be treated as functions of information
sets of the form (N, hk, ci) or (N, hk, ci, p). In what follows, we abuse notation
by using the notation for finite histories to denote these information sets. In
eﬀect, we simply suppress the parts of the finite history that are not relevant
for strategies. The set of information sets at which agent k controls play is
denoted by HMk and defined by
HMk = {(N, hk, ci)| k, c ∈ N,N balanced}∪
{(N, hc, ki, p)| k, c ∈ N,N balanced,p ∈ R+} .
The set of Markov strategies is denoted by FMk and defined by
fk ∈ FMk = {f : Hk → {accept, reject} ∪R+|
f(N, hk, ci) ∈ R+, f(N, hc, ki, p) ∈ {accept, reject}} .
4 Examples
In this section we maintain the rules of the game defined in the preced-
ing section. The first example shows the existence of a continuum of non-
competitive Markov perfect equilibria for a market with sequential random
matching.
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4.1 Random sequential matching
Suppose n = 2 and v1 > v2 > w2 > w1. Thus m = n = 2 and there is no
possibility of ineﬃcient trade. We construct a Markov perfect equilibrium
(MPE) of the game as follows. Let pij denote the price at which buyer i and
seller j will trade if they are the last pair of agents left in the market, where
wj ≤ pij ≤ vi













2) be defined implicitly as follows:
v1 − v∗1 =
1
2
(p11 + p21) = w1 + w
∗
1,
v2 − v∗2 =
1
2
(p22 + p21) = w2 + w
∗
2.
Our strategy for proving the existence of a continuum of non-competitive
equilibria is to treat the numbers v∗i andw
∗
j as if they represent the reservation
utilities of the agents and then show that these are precisely the payoﬀs that
agents achieve in equilibrium. Direct calculation shows that
v∗1 + w
∗
1 = v1 − w1 (1a)
v∗2 + w
∗
2 = v2 − w2 (1b)
v∗1 + w
∗
2 = v1 − w2 −
1
2
(p11 − p22) < v1 − w2 (1c)
v∗2 + w
∗
1 = v2 − w1 −
1
2
(p22 − p11) > v2 − w1. (1d)
So, in the early stages of the game (before any trade has occurred), each of
three pairs of agents (i, j) 6= (2, 1) can trade the good.9
9Trade between buyer 2 and seller 1 is not individually rational because, by construc-
tion, v∗2 +w∗1 > v2 −w1. Thus, we only have to consider the three subgames in which the
first pair to trade is (i, j) = (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2).
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When a pair of agents (i, j) 6= (2, 1) is matched, if i is the proposer he
oﬀers a price p = w∗j +wj, which is accepted by j, and if j is the proposer he
oﬀers a price p = vi−v∗i , which is also accepted. When the pair (i, j) = (2, 1)
is matched, no trade occurs. If the pairs (1, 1) or (2, 2) are the first to trade,
the price does not depend on the identity of the proposer. If the pair (1, 2)
is the first to trade, the price does depend on the identity of the proposer,








(2p21 + p11 + p22)
= p21.
Each of the three cases is equally likely. The data are summarized in the
following table.
Probability First trade Mean Price Second Trade Price
1/3 (1, 1) v1 − v∗1 = w1 + w∗1 (2, 2) p22
1/3 (2, 2) v2 − v∗2 = w2 + w∗2 (1, 1) p11
1/3 (1, 2) p21 (2, 1) p21
After the first trade occurs, there are three possible subgames that can occur
on the equilibrium path, depending on which of three pairs traded first. If
(1, 1) trade first, the subgame consists of buyer 2 and seller 2 who exchange
the good at a price of p22. If (2, 2) trade first, the subgame consists of buyer
1 and seller 1 who exchange the good at a price of p11. If (1, 2) trade first,
the subgame consists of buyer 2 and seller 1 who exchange the good at a
price of p21.
It is clear that these outcomes can be supported as MPE of the subgames
(any individually rational trades are MPE outcomes for the two-person sub-
games). By inspection of the equations and inequalities in (1), the strategies
in the first stages of the game, before the first trade occurs, are best re-
sponses, given the assumed payoﬀs from the continuation game. It remains















(p11 + p21) ,
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where the three terms in the first line correspond to first trades by (1, 1), (2, 2)











































(p22 + p21)− w2,
as required.
So far we have defined the equilibrium path; it is clear how to define the
complete strategies to deal with deviations from the equilibrium path (reject
oﬀers that are worse than the equilibrium payoﬀ and accept those that are
better).
This example shows that trade occurs at non-uniform prices and that
some of these prices do not belong to the competitive interval (for some
choices of p11 and p22, seller 1 and buyer 1 trade at a price higher than
v2). Since the parameters p11 and p22 can be chosen arbitrarily within some
small intervals, there exists a continuum of non-competitive, Markov-perfect
equilibria.
Proposition 5 Let w1 < w2 < v2 < v1 define a market. There exists a







v1 − v∗1 =
1
2
(p11 + p21) = w1 + w
∗
1,
v2 − v∗2 =
1
2




where the parameters (p11, p21, p22) satisfy






Note also that the equilibrium payoﬀs change non-monotonically across
subgames. For example, seller 1’s payoﬀ before any trade has occurred is w∗1.
If seller 2 and buyer 2 trade first, then seller 1 is in a subgame with buyer
1 and trade occurs at the price p11. If seller 2 and buyer 1 trade first, then













These relations imply that
p21 − w1 < w∗1 < p11 − w1.
Thus, if seller 1 is not one of the first agents to trade, his payoﬀ may go
up or down, depending on the identity of the first pair of agents to trade.
This non-monotonic behavior of payoﬀs turns out to be a crucial feature of
non-competitive equilibria.
The strategies that support the MPE depend only on the players who are
matched and the identity of the proposer. It is clear that these strategies
constitute a PEC, so lexicographic complexity costs (in the sense used by
GS) do not guarantee a Walrasian outcome when there is random matching.
4.2 Discounting
In market games with exogenous matching, introducing a small amount of
discounting is sometimes enough to ensure the uniqueness of perfect equi-
librium. As mentioned before, under certain conditions, the unique perfect
equilibrium with discounting converges to the competitive outcome as the
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discount rate converges to 1. The next example shows that this strategy
does not work for markets with heterogeneous buyers and sellers.
Consider a symmetric market in which there are two buyers and two
sellers and all agents are inframarginal. The valuations of the agents are





v1 = v + w
for some 0 < w < v. Payoﬀs are discounted using a common discount factor
0 < δ < 1. The next result characterizes the symmetric MPE payoﬀs for this
example.
Proposition 6 Let (w1, w2, v1, v2) = (0, w, v+w, v) define a symmetric mar-
ket with common discount factor δ. For some δ∗ < 1 and all δ∗ < δ < 1,
there is a unique symmetric MPE of the game with discounting in which the









(1 + 2δ)v − δw − δv∗1
8− 3δ .
After the first pair of agents has traded, the remaining two agents are in
a two-person bargaining game and we know from the bargaining literature
(e.g., Rubinstein (1982)) that with equal discount factors they will split the
surplus. More precisely, the division of the surplus will depend on who is the
proposer but ex ante they have equal chances of being proposer and hence
receive equal payoﬀs. If w1 and v1 (resp. w2 and v2) are left to trade in the
two-person subgame, they each receive (v+w)/2 (resp. (v−w)/2) if w1 and
v2 (resp. w2 and v1) are left to trade in the two-person subgame, they will
each receive v/2. As δ → 1 the prices become independent of the proposer.
If w1 and v1 (resp. w2 and v2) are left to trade in the two-person subgame,
the price at which they trade will be approximately (v+w)/2; by contrast, if
w1 and v2 (resp. w2 and v1) are left to trade in the two-person subgame, the
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price at which they trade will be approximately v/2 (resp. w + v/2). The
competitive interval is [w2, v2] = [w, v], which need not contain any of these
prices.
In a symmetric MPE, v1 and w1 receive the same payoﬀ and v2 and w2















(1 + 2δ)v − δw − δv∗1
8− 3δ .
Our strategy, as before, is to treat these numbers as if they represent the
reservation utilities of the agents, define individual strategies accordingly,
and then show that these are precisely the payoﬀs achieved in equilibrium.
Substituting v∗2 into the first equation and simplifying yields
v∗1 =
(8− 3δ) [(2 + δ)v + w]− δ(1 + 2δ)v + δ2w


























δ (v∗1 + w
∗
1) = v +
1
2




δ (v∗2 + w
∗
2) = v −
1
2
w > v − w. (3)
Thus, by (2) and (3), for δ close to 1, as long as there are four agents remain-
ing, v1 and w1 must trade whenever matched and v2 and w2 cannot trade
whenever matched. Summing the equations that define v∗1 and v
∗
2 we get











(8δ − 3δ2 + δ2) (v∗1 + v∗2) = δ ((3 + δ)v + (1− δ)w)
δ(8− 2δ) (v∗1 + v∗2) = δ ((3 + δ)v + (1− δ)w)




(8− 2δ) ((3 + δ)v + (1− δ)w)
<
δ(4 + δ)v
(8− 2δ) < v.






2 this establishes that, as long as there are four
agents remaining, whenever v1 and w2 meet or v2 and w1 meet, they must
trade.
The Markov strategies for the game with four agents remaining are as fol-
lows. If (i, j) = (2, 2) are matched, no individually rational trade is possible,
so the proposer makes an oﬀer that the responder must reject. Otherwise, if
(i, j) 6= (2, 2) and i is chosen as the proposer, he proposes a price
pij = wj + δw
∗
j ,
and wj accepts any price greater than or equal to pij and rejects any other
price. If j is chosen as the proposer, then he proposes a price
pji = vi − δv∗i
and vi accepts any price less than or equal to pji and rejects any other price.
The two-person subgames have unique MPE.
It remains to show that these strategies constitute a symmetric MPE.
In the game with four agents remaining, there are four equally probable
matches: (v1, w1), (v1, w2), (v2, w1), (v2, w2). The fourth results in no trade.





































































































(8− 3δ) v∗1 = (2 + δ)v + w − δv∗2,
(8− 3δ) v∗2 = (1 + 2δ)v − δw − δv∗1,
which gives the definitions above.
This proves that we have constructed a symmetric, Markov-perfect equi-
librium. To see that it is unique, one only has to note that any symmetric,




1 , and v
∗∗
2 that will
uniquely determine the individual strategies. It can be further shown that,
in any symmetric MPE, the pair (i, j) must trade in the initial four-person
subgames if and only if (i, j) 6= (2, 2). Then the preceding calculations show







The equilibrium described in the proposition is non-competitive because
(a) trade takes place at non-uniform prices and (b) these prices may not
belong to the competitive interval. This is true even as δ → 1. Let p(n)kc
denote the limiting value, as δ → 1, of the price at which k and c trade when
there are n agents left in the market, k is the proposer and c is the responder.
Solving the equations above, we see that the equilibrium payoﬀs in the limit





















1 = v +
1
2
w < v + w,
v∗2 + w
∗
2 = v −
1
2









When there are four agents in the market, (i, j) = (2, 2) cannot trade,
(i, j) = (1, 1) trade at prices depending on the identity of the proposer,
and (i, j) = (1, 2), (2, 1) trade at unique price, independently of the identity
of the proposer. When there are only two agents left, they trade at a price
that splits the surplus equally, independently of the identity of the proposer.
Thus, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 7 In the equilibrium described in Proposition 6, the equilibrium























(v + w) if (k, c) = (1, 1), (2, 2),
1
2
v if {k, c} = {i, j}, (i, j) = (2, 1),
1
2
v + w if {k, c} = {i, j}, (i, j) = (1, 2).
Note that the example can be generalized to allow for asymmetry and a
larger number of buyers and sellers: the restrictive assumptions used here
are for illustrative purposes only.
5 Monotonicity
The example in Section 4.1 shows that the Markov property is not enough,
by itself, to establish perfect competition. Here we introduce an additional
property, which we call monotonicity. First, we note that in any Markov
equilibrium, payoﬀs are monotonically non-increasing in an expected value
sense. If f∗ is a Markov equilibrium and N is a set of remaining players, let
Uk(N, f
∗) denote the equilibrium payoﬀ in the subgame defined by N , for
any k ∈ N .
Lemma 8 Let f∗ be a Markov equilibrium and N a set of remaining players
observed with positive probability on the equilibrium path. For any k ∈ N ,
agent k’s payoﬀ Ui(N, f∗) must be at least as great as the expected payoﬀ
from the continuation game.
Proof. By stationarity, buyer i will never trade in the subgame with remain-
ing agents N at a price that gives him less than Ui(N, f∗), since his contin-
uation payoﬀ will be Ui(N, f∗) if he rejects. Since Ui(N, f∗) is a weighted
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average of what he gets if he trades first and what he gets in the subgames
after the first trade has occurred, the expected continuation payoﬀ must be
less than or equal to Ui(N, f ∗).
The monotonicity assumption is just a strengthening of this property.
It requires that payoﬀs be non-increasing with probability one along the
equilibrium path and not just in an expected-value sense.
Definition 9 A Markov equilibrium f∗ is monotonic if, along the equilib-
rium path, payoﬀs are monotonically non-increasing with probability one.
Formally, a Markov equilibrium f∗ is monotonic if, for any subgames N
and N 0, with N ⊂ N 0, that are reached with positive probability and any
k ∈ N , Uk(N, f ∗) ≤ Uk(N 0, f∗).
From Lemma 8 and the definition, it is clear that monotonicity is auto-
matically satisfied whenever there is no uncertainty about equilibrium pay-
oﬀs. For example, if f∗ is a Markov equilibrium and the matching process
is deterministic, then in each subgame the payoﬀs in the continuation game
are known with certainty and Lemma 8 implies that f∗ is monotonic.
More importantly, if f∗ is competitive in the sense that
Ui(N, f
∗) = max{vi − p, 0}, i = 1, ..., n,
Uj(N, f
∗) = max{p− wj, 0}, j = 1, ..., n.
for some price p and every subgame N reached with positive probability on
the equilibrium path, f∗ is clearly monotonic.
So far, we have been deliberately vague about the definition of equilibrium
used in the sequel. The game analyzed here is a game of perfect information,
so subgame perfect equilibrium would be an appropriate solution concept.
However, it turns out that the full power of subgame perfection is not needed.
Something much closer to Nash equilibrium will suﬃce for the purpose of
characterizing equilibrium outcomes and that is what we use. This weakening
of the equilibrium concept turns out to be helpful in guaranteeing existence
of equilibrium with complexity costs, as we discuss in Section 7.
Intuitively, we consider a Nash equilibrium refined by the requirement
that, after any history that occurs with positive probability along the equi-
librium path, agents respond optimally to every possible proposal and not
just those that occur with positive probability in equilibrium. Let f∗ be a
Markov Nash equilibrium and let E denote the equilibrium path, that is, the
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set of finite histories that occur with positive probability in this equilibrium.
We say that f∗ is response-perfect if, for every (N, hc, ki) ∈ Hrk ∩ E and
p ∈ R+,




reject if k = i and vi − p < Ui(N, f∗)
accept if k = i and vi − p > Ui(N, f∗)
reject if k = j and p− wj < Uj(N, f∗)
accept if k = j and p− wj > Uj(N, f∗).
Response-perfect Markov Nash equilibrium is still quite a weak equilib-
rium concept because we only consider the response to a single deviation
from the equilibrium path, rather than arbitrary finite numbers of deviations
in the case of SPE. It is easy to see why response perfection, rather than
full subgame perfection, is suﬃcient for our purposes. If an agent deviates,
his deviation either results in trade, in which case he is out of the game,
or it does not result in trade, in which case the market is the same at the
next date. Markov strategies do not “remember” deviations from previous
periods. Thus, a deviation that does not result in trade has no eﬀect on the
future play of the game. In determining his optimal strategy, an agent only
needs to consider what happens along the equilibrium path or the response
to a single deviation from the equilibrium path.
Let f∗ be a response-perfect, Markov Nash equilibrium. We have seen
that f∗ is monotonic if it is competitive. The following series of results
establishes the converse: if f∗ is monotonic, then it must also be competitive.
Theorem 10 Let f∗ be a response-perfect, monotonic Nash equilibrium in
Markov strategies for the market game Γ. Then exchange is eﬃcient and
there exists a price p in the competitive interval such that the equilibrium
payoﬀs satisfy
Ui(f
∗) = max{vi − p, 0}, i = 1, ..., n,
Uj(f
∗) = max{p− wj , 0}, j = 1, ..., n.
Proof. Let f∗ be a fixed but arbitrary response-perfect and monotonic Nash
equilibrium in Markov strategies. The proof is by (backward) induction on
the number of agents remaining in the game.
Starting the induction.
To start the induction, let N0 be a minimal set of agents (possibly the empty
set) observed with positive probability on the equilibrium path, that is, no
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proper subset of N0 is observed along the equilibrium path. (Note that N0
need not be unique). We claim that Ui(N0, f∗) = Uj(N0, f∗) = 0, for every
i and j in N0. The proof is by contradiction. If N0 = ∅ or vi ≤ wj for
every i and j in N0 the result is obviously true, so we can assume without
essential loss of generality that there exists a pair (i0, j0) in N0 such that
vi0 > wj0. Because the strategies are Markovian, the equilibrium payoﬀs
Ui0(N0, f
∗) and Uj0(N0, f
∗) are stationary. Buyer i0 can guarantee a payoﬀ
of vi0 − wj0 − Uj0(N, f∗) − ε, for any ε > 0, by waiting until he is proposer
and oﬀering a price p = wj0+Uj0(N0, f
∗)+ε which seller j0 must accept. By
similar reasoning, seller j0 can guarantee a payoﬀ of vi0−Ui0(N0, f∗)−ε−wj0
for any ε > 0. Since the choice of ε is arbitrary, this proves that Ui0(N0, f
∗)+
Uj0(N0, f
∗) ≥ vi0 − wj0 > 0. This implies that at least one of the agents
trades with positive probability in the subgame defined by N0, contradicting
the assumption that N0 is a minimal set occurring along the equilibrium
path. This contradiction proves that Ui(N0, f∗) = Uj(N0, f ∗) = 0, for every
i and j in N0.
The induction step
Suppose that, for some positive integer q, the following condition is satisfied
for any set of agents N observed along the equilibrium path and satisfying
|N | ≤ 2q.
Induction Hypothesis: In the subgame beginning when N is first ob-
served, exchange is eﬃcient and there exists a price p in the competitive
interval of the market with remaining agents N such that the payoﬀs are
given by
Ui(N, f
∗) = max{vi − p, 0},
Uj(N, f
∗) = max{p− wj, 0},
for any i, j ∈ N . (If the competitive interval is empty, we interpret the
equations as implying Ui(N, f ∗) = Uj(N, f∗) = 0 for all i, j ∈ N).
Now consider a set of agents N , observed with positive probability along
the equilibrium path, such that |N | = 2(q+1) and consider what happens in
the subgame that begins when N is first observed. Since the equilibrium is
fixed in the sequel, we suppress the reference to f∗ and denote the equilibrium
payoﬀs in this subgame by Ui(N) and Uj(N) for i, j ∈ N .
Step 1. Suppose that buyer i0 trades first with probability 1. Then
the Induction Hypothesis is satisfied.
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If buyer i0 trades first with probability 1, then buyer i0 controls the possibility
of trade. This means that
Ui0(N) ≥ maxj∈J∩N {vi0 − wj − Uj(N)} .
For any i, j ∈ N, i 6= i0,
Ui(N) + Uj(N) ≥ vi − wj.
Otherwise, i and j would trade with positive probability. The total surplus









where I 0 ⊆ I ∩N and J 0 ⊆ J ∩N are the maximal sets |I 0| = |J 0| such that
wj < vi for all i ∈ I 0 and j ∈ J 0. (There is no essential loss of generality in
ignoring i and j such that wj = vi). Now, individual rationality implies that

























It follows immediately that Ui(N) = 0 = Uj(N) for extramarginal agents
i ∈ N ∩ (I\I 0) and j ∈ N ∩ (J\J 0) and Ui(N) + Uj(N) = vi − wj for
inframarginal agents i ∈ I 0 and j ∈ J 0. Then putting
p = vi − Ui(N) = wj + Uj(N),∀i ∈ I 0, ∀j ∈ J 0,
establishes the claim.
Step 2. If seller j trades first with probability 1, the Induction
Hypothesis is satisfied.
The argument is exactly similar to Step 1.
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Step 3. Suppose that two distinct pairs have a positive probability
of trading first. Then the conditions of the Induction Hypothesis
are satisfied.
Fix any i, j ∈ N . By assumption there exist i0 6= i and j0 6= j such that (i0, j0)
have a positive probability of trading first. But as soon as the pair (i0, j0)
trades, the Induction Hypothesis implies that the payoﬀs of i, j ∈ N\{i0, j0}
in the continuation game are determined by a price p0 such that
Ui(N\{i0, j0}, f ∗) = max{vi − p0, 0},
Uj(N\{i0, j0}, f ∗) = max{p0 − wj, 0}.
Since i, j ∈ N\{i0, j0}, monotonicity implies that
wj + Uj(N) ≥ p0 ≥ vi − Ui(N).
Thus, for any i, j ∈ N ,
Ui(N) + Uj(N) ≥ vi − wj.
The rest of the argument follows as in Step 1. This establishes the claim.
Theorem 10 establishes that the equilibrium payoﬀs correspond to a com-
petitive equilibrium, but it does not explicitly state that all trade occurs at a
common price p. However, this is an easy corollary of the Theorem together
with monotonicity.
Corollary 11 Let f∗ be a response-perfect, monotonic Nash equilibrium in
Markov strategies for the market game Γ. Then all trade occurs at a common
price p in every subgame observed along the equilibrium path.
Proof. In the course of proving Theorem 10 we showed that, for any set of
agents N observed on the equilibrium path, there exists a price p such that
Ui(N, f
∗) = max{vi − p, 0},∀i ∈ I ∩N
Uj(N, f
∗) = max{p− wj, 0},∀j ∈ J ∩N.
Monotonicity implies that, for any N 0 ⊂ N observed along the equilibrium
path,
Uk(N, f
∗) ≥ Uk(N 0, f∗), ∀k ∈ N.
This immediately implies that
Ui(N
0, f∗) = max{vi − p, 0},∀i ∈ I ∩N 0
Uj(N
0, f∗) = max{p− wj, 0},∀j ∈ J ∩N 0.
In other words, trade occurs at the same price p in the subgame defined by
N 0. By induction, all trade occurs at a common price p.
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6 Global complexity
Monotonicity is a restriction on equilibrium continuation payoﬀs. As such,
it is in need of some motivation. One way of motivating monotonicity is
to show that it follows from lexicographic minimization of complexity costs.
As we mentioned earlier, GS apply a concept of complexity that is ‘local’ in
the sense that the partial ordering of strategies according to complexity is
defined in terms of individual subgames. Here we use a concept of complexity
that is ‘global’ in the sense that the partial ordering of strategies involves
comparisons across subgames.
To measure complexity, we define a partial ordering ≺r on Fk as follows:
Definition 12 For any strategies fk, f 0k ∈ Fk, we say that fk is (globally) less
complex than f 0k, written fk ≺r f 0k, if and only if, for some partial information
set d ∈ {hk, ci , (hc, ki , p)},
f 0k(N, d) = f
0
k(N
0, d), ∀N,N 0
fk(N, d) 6= fk(N 0, d), for some N and N 0
and
fk(N, d
0) = f 0k(N, d
0), ∀N,∀d0 6= d.
This notion of complexity requires two strategies to be identical every-
where except on information sets of the form (N, d) for some particular par-
tial history d. On this information set, f 0k prescribes the same action for all
subgames defined by a set of remaining agents N but fk prescribes diﬀerent
actions for subgames defined by two sets of remaining agents N and N 0. This
is the notion of global complexity applied to the set of all strategies in GS. It
is ‘global’ in the sense that it compares the complexity of two strategies for a
given partial information set d across all subgames N . It is also stronger than
is needed for the result that follows. For Theorem 15, the following notion of
complexity, which is clearly implied by global complexity, is suﬃcient. For
any information sets h, h0 ∈ Hk, we write h ≥ h0 if
h = (N, d), h0 = (N 0, d), N 0 ⊂ N.
Definition 13 For any strategies fk, f 0k ∈ Fk, we say that fk is less complex
than f 0k, written fk ≺r f 0k, if and only if, for some information set h ∈ Hk,
f 0k(h
0) = f 0k(h
00), ∀h0, h00 ≥ h
fk(h
0) 6= fk(h00), ∃h0, h00 ≥ h,
f 0k(h
0) = fk(h0) ∀h0 ¤ h.
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This weaker definition restricts the comparisons of the two strategies to
subgames in which the set of remaining players is N 0 ⊆ N , for some fixed N ,
whereas the previous definition admits all sets N 0.
Definition 14 A Nash equilibrium with complexity costs and perfect re-
sponses (NECPR) is a Nash equilibrium with perfect responses f∗ such that,
for every agent k, there does not exist a strategy fk that is a best response to
f∗−k and is less complex than f
∗
k (in the sense of Definition 12 or Definition
13).
Theorem 15 Let f∗ be a Markov equilibrium with perfect responses for the
market game Γ. Then (a) if f∗ is monotonic there exists a NECPR f∗∗ with
the same payoﬀs and (b) if f∗ is a NECPR it is monotonic.
Proof. To prove (a) it is suﬃcient to note that by Theorem 10 f∗ is com-
petitive with equilibrium price p∗, say. Then we can define the NECPR f∗∗
as follows: for any (h, hk, ci) ∈ Hpk put
f∗∗k (h, hk, ci) =
½
min{p∗, vk} if k ∈ I
max{p∗, wk} if k ∈ J
and for any (h, hk, ci) ∈ Hrk and any price p put




accept p ≥ max{p∗, wk}, k ∈ J
accept p ≤ min{p∗, vk}, k ∈ I
reject p < max{p∗, wk}, k ∈ J
reject p > min{p∗, vk}, k ∈ I
It is clear that f∗∗ so defined is a NECPR in Markov strategies and has the
same payoﬀs as f∗.
To prove (b) we assume that f∗ is a NECPR and prove that it is com-
petitive. The proof is the identical to the proof of Theorem 10 up to Step
3, because this is the only part of the proof where an appeal is made to
monotonicity.
Step 3. Suppose that two distinct pairs have a positive prob-
ability of trading first. Then the conditions of the Induction Hy-
pothesis are satisfied.
Fix any i, j ∈ N . Then by assumption there exist i0 6= i and j0 6= j
such that (i0, j0) have a positive probability of trading first. But as soon as
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the pair (i0, j0) trades, the Induction Hypothesis implies that the payoﬀs of
i, j ∈ N\{i0, j0} in the continuation game are determined by a price p0 such
that
Ui(N\{i0, j0}, f ∗) = max{vi − p0, 0},
Uj(N\{i0, j0}, f ∗) = max{p0 − wj, 0}.
Now since f∗ satisfies perfect responses, agent i must accept any price below
vi − Ui(N) and agent j must accept any price above wj + Uj(N) in the
subgame where N is the set of agents remaining. Since f∗ is a NECPR, in
all subgames, including the subgame where N\{i0, j0} is the set of agents
remaining, agent i must accept any price p < vi−Ui(N) oﬀered by an agent
c ∈ N\{i0, j0} that does not occur on the equilibrium path. Otherwise, we
could define less complex strategy fi ≺r f∗i by putting
fi(N




0, d) ∀d 6= (hc, ii , p) ,
and note that fi is a best response because it diﬀers from f∗i only oﬀ the
equilibrium path, contradicting the definition of NECPR. By a similar argu-
ment, agent j must accept any price above wj + Uj(N) that does not occur
on the equilibrium path. In any interval there is a dense set of prices that do
not occur on the equilibrium path, so the preceding claim is consistent with
equilibrium in the subgame with agents N\{i0, j0} only if
wj + Uj(N) ≥ p0 ≥ vi − Ui(N).
Thus, for any pair i, j ∈ N ,
Ui(N) + Uj(N) ≥ vi − wj.
The rest of the argument is identical to Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 10.
This establishes that the equilibrium payoﬀs correspond to a competitive
equilibrium, but it does not guarantee that all trade occurs at the same
competitive price. To show this, we merely note that, in each subgame
reached along the equilibrium path, each agent i remaining in the game will
accept any price below vi − Ui(N) and each agent j remaining in the game
will accept any price above wj + Uj(N), where Ui(N) and Uj(N) are their
equilibrium payoﬀs. Clearly, this suﬃces to maintain a uniform price and
implies that f∗ is monotonic.
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7 Discussion
7.1 Existence of SPEC in Markov strategies
In place of the “natural” solution concept, subgame perfect equilibrium, we
used the weaker concept of Nash equilibrium with perfect responses. It is
interesting that a weaker notion of equilibrium is suﬃcient to characterize the
competitive outcomes, but the choice of solution concept is to some extent
driven by necessity. Adding the refinement of complexity costs to subgame
perfect equilibrium may threaten existence, as the following example shows.
Proposition 16 Consider a market consisting of four agents with valuations
satisfying w1 < v2 < w2 < v1 and the matching process described in Section
3. Then if f∗ is a NECPR in Markov strategies, it cannot also be a SPE.
Proof. We argue by contradiction. Suppose that f∗ is a NECPR in Markov
strategies and a SPE. By Theorem 15, any NECPR f∗ in Markov strategies
will result in w1 and v1 trading at a price p∗ ∈ [v2, w2]. Next, we claim that if
f∗ is also a SPE, then in the (oﬀ-equilibrium) subgame with remaining agents
N = {v1, w2}, trade will occur with probability one at a price p12 ∈ [w2, v1].
To see this, note that Markov strategies imply that agents have stationary
payoﬀs v∗1 and w
∗
2 as long as the set of agents is N . In a SPE, v1 must accept
any price p < v1 − v∗1 and w2 must accept any price p > w2 + w∗2. It follows
that v1 − w2 = v∗1 + w∗2 and hence that trade occurs with probability one at
p12 = v1 − v∗1 = w2 + w∗2. Individual rationality implies that p12 ∈ [w2, v1].
A similar argument shows that in the subgame with remaining players
N = {w1, v2}, trade occurs with probability one at a price p21 ∈ [w1, v2].
Then global complexity implies that p12 = p21 = p∗. For example, if
p12 > p
∗, then in the subgame with N = {w2, v1} the buyer v1 should accept
any price p∗ < p < p12. Then a complexity argument shows that a price
p∗ < p < p12 that is not oﬀered along the equilibrium path should be accepted
by v1 everywhere. But this is clearly not consistent with equilibrium. A
similar argument rules out p21 < p∗. Since p12 = p21 is impossible, this
contradiction shows that f∗ cannot be a SPE.
7.2 Exogenous, simultaneous moves
The bulk of this paper is devoted to games with sequential matching, i.e.,
games in which exactly one pair of agents is allowed to bargain and trade at a
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time. In this section we briefly discusse the class of games with simultaneous
matching and show that new sets of non-competitive MPE arise in these
models too for reaons that are quite diﬀerent from the ones discussed in
Section 4.
Assume that m = 1 and n = 2 and that
w1 < v2 < w2 < v1.
Matching is random and every buyer-seller pair has equal probability and
each member of the pair has an equal probability of being chosen as the
proposer.
Consider the following strategies: when the pair (i, j) such that vi > wj is
formed, the proposer oﬀers to trade at the price pij ∈ [wj, vi]; the responder
accepts any price that is at least as good as pij and rejects any other oﬀer. We
claim that these strategies constitute a MPE for the simultaneous matching
game. The strategies are clearly stationary: they depend only on the matched
pair of agents. The strategies clearly form a subgame perfect equilibrium of
the subgames in which only a single buyer and seller are left. Furthermore,
when the pair (i, j) forms, they are either the only agents left in the market
or they expect the other two agents, who are currently matched, to trade
immediately and leave the market. Thus, if i and j do not trade in the
current period, they expect to trade at the price pij in the continuation game.
Then clearly it is optimal for the agents to follow the specified strategy in
the current period.
This shows that the exogenous simultaneous move game has a continuum
of stationary (Markov) non-competitive equilibria.
Random matching is not necessary for this example. The same con-
struction works with deterministic matching as long as agents are matched
simultaneously. In this case, the structure of the game is not stationary, but
the strategies are stationary since they depend only on the current match.
The definition of a MPE should allow strategies to depend on time because
the matching rule depends on time, but a stationary strategy does not have
to depend on time.
We also note that the strategies in these examples are stationary as a
function of N so global complexity will not eliminate these equilibria either.
The equilibria are also monotonic. All this suggests that the equilibria are
quite robust in this framework. However, it is important to note that there
is something contrived about exogenous simultaneous matching: it requires
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perfect coordination of timing in order to sustain the non-competitive equi-
libria. It is also possible that noisy exogenous matching processes or endoge-
nous simultaneous matching processes will destroy such equilibria. For these
reasons we think the results that are due to the exogenous and the simulta-
neous nature of the matching model are not appealing. In GS we investigate
endogenous simultaneous matching and show that complexity type reasoning
can be eﬀective in selecting a competitive outcome in such a set-up.
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